CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 186

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alternatively, they might seek to restore something of their prestige by strengthening their military position in the Yemen. For the same reason, it was possible that they might decide to risk an attack on South Arabia after independence, despite the deterrent that would be posed by the

V bombers.

The balance of advantage, however, was in his view in favour of making the offer and stating that it would be extended beyond the six months' period of the offer of carrier-borne air forces, but that it would be continued or terminated entirely at the discretion of the United

Kingdon Government.

THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that there should be no difficulty

is e vis obtaining the agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to stationing four V bombers at Masirah and the

additional cost of doing so would be negligible. Militarily, the use

that could be nade of V bombers would necessarily be limited; in particular,

they could not be used effectively against local insurgency, but only in

the event of outright attack by Egyptian forces and even then they could not be used for either ground attack or interception. Politically, it

might be that this offer would put the position of the Sultan of Muscat

at greater risk of subversion in his own territory and it was for

consideration what effect the offer would have on our wider interests

in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the balance of advantage night well

favour making the offer, but it would be desirable to put some limitation

on it and this might be to relate the length of our commitment to the

effective building up of the forces of the independent government of

South Arabia.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (Lord Shackleton) said that the

principal difficulty at present in South Arabia was the lack of confidence

their ability of the Federal Government being that they would be able to cope with the

problems with which they would be faced after independence unless they were

given protection against external aggression.

Furthermore, unless they

were given greater confidence, it would be impracticable to obtain

agreement on any broadening of their political composition. Their

principal objection to the offer of carrier-borne air forces was that it

would only last for six months and despite the limitation on the role in

which the V bombers could be used, they should pose an effective deterrent

against Egyptian aggression and would in any event give the South Arabian

Government the necessary additional confidence. His own preference would

be to make a commitment that such bombers would be made available for up

to two years after independence, but there were advantages in making the

date of termination a matter for our discretion.

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